An evolutionary game theoretic charging mechanism aimed at incentivizing charge sharing without any change in infrastructure

Abstract

This thesis presents a novel mechanism for charge sharing in between Electric Vehicles or EVs. Electric vehicles face some obstacles in the face of adoption over conventional cars. Electric vehicles (EVs) have a limited driving range due to battery limits. EV charging stations are also sometimes rather far apart, and they are not widely available in many areas. Battery depletion entails traveling to remote places or even taking detours, both of which increase the total driving time of EVs. Under the proposed network design, an EV that does not have enough energy to finish its route can ask for energy. Other EVs close to it may respond. It is to be kept in mind that every EV is selfish about its own charge. The model utilizes Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) and replicator equation on graphs. The EV that needs extra energy and makes the initiative to ask for such is the receiver. The respondents may either be givers or non-givers. Givers choose to share their energy, whereas non-givers don’t. Givers get a fixed incentive that topples the potential cost of driving to the receiver, whereas nongivers neither gain or lose anything. In the model proposed in this thesis, an attempt is made to control this incentive, thus controlling the total number of givers in the world. The results show that an equilibrium can be established in a system where givers are consistently created. This balance is achieved by altering the incentive provided by EVs with decreased energy levels. Thus, an effective energy sharing system is proved to be sustainable utilizing a theoretical and numerical approach as well as a simulation model to substantiate the theoretical model.